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UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING INTERNATIONAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE LAW: U.N. 
REGULATIONS DURING AN H5N1 AVIAN FLU EPIDEMIC 
 
TIMOTHY J. MIANO  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1918, over one billion people – half the world’s population – contracted a virulent 
form of bird flu.1  Spain was the first country to report an outbreak of the disease, and thus the 
flu strain became known as the Spanish Flu.  The virus killed more than eight million Spaniards 
in one month.2  Influenza killed approximately fifty million people worldwide that year, 
including 500,000 people in the United States.3 
In 2003, a strain of avian flu known as H5N1 spurred new fears of a flu pandemic, this 
time in South Korea.4  In response, Korean authorities culled the region’s entire poultry 
population, killing over 150 million birds.5  As of December 2005, fifteen countries have 
reported cases of the “highly pathogenic” H5N1 virus in poultry.6  Five of those countries have 
reported 120 cases of interspecies transmission to humans,7 67 of which were fatal.8 
 Although an infectious disease pandemic implicates many areas of international law, 
most of those areas of law lack sufficient maturity to provide any concrete guidance during a 
large-scale emergency.  For example, in Case of D v. United Kingdom,9 the European Court of 
Human Rights held that Britain could not deport a convicted drug trafficker back to his home 
                                                 
 George Mason University School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2007; Articles Editor, George Mason Law 
Review, 2006-2007; University of Virginia, B.A., Physics, May 2004. The author thanks Professor David P. Fidler 
for providing access to his forthcoming work on the revised International Health Regulations; and Kristin Lehner for 
always caring. 
1 Time Trip: Killer Flu of 1918, 105 CURRENT EVENTS 3, (Sept. 23, 2005). 
2 Id. 
3 Lauren Etter, Avian Flu: Pandemic on the Horizon, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2005, at A5.  
4 In a Flap – Avian Influenza, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005.  
5 Id. 
6 World Health Organization, H5N1 Avian Influenza: Timeline, Oct. 28, 2005,  available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/Timeline_28_10a.pdf.  
7 Id. 
8 ECONOMIST, supra note 4. 
9 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 423, 2 B.H.R.C. 273 (1997). 
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country of St. Kitts because the developing nation lacked the health standards necessary to treat 
D’s late stage AIDS.10  The European Court found that deporting D would have violated human 
rights norms requiring humane treatment because D would have spent “his remaining days in 
pain and suffering in conditions of isolation, squalor and destitution.”11  Although the theory 
behind the European Court’s application of normative international human rights law had 
merit,12 other courts have declined to follow Case of D in the absence of “compelling 
circumstances.”13  Broadly speaking, despite its noble aspirations, the rule of law espoused in 
Case of D carries little practical weight when applied to an emergency of notable magnitude 
because this rule presumes that the nation adjudicating the claim is not actively under the threat 
of an epidemic.14 
Like the human rights law applied in Case of D, principles from the law of war and 
international environmental law tangentially address infectious disease through such topics as the 
treatment of detainees, the use of biological weapons, the standards of air and water quality, and 
the problems accompanying deforestation.15  As in Case of D, these areas of international law 
have value during isolated incidents or in cultivating national policy.  However, these 
international doctrines provide no practical guidance in the prevention of or in the reaction to 
widespread infectious disease.  
                                                 
10 Id. at 436. 
11 Id. at 445. 
12 See Stephanie Palmer, AIDS, Expulsion, and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 EUR. 
HUM. RTS. L.REV. 533, 536 (2005). 
13 Id. at 533 (citing N v. Sec’y of State, 4 Eng. Rep. 1017 (H.L. 2005)). 
14 Some officials estimate 150 million human deaths in a H5N1 epidemic.  World Health Agency Tones Down Alarm 
on Possible Flu Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005.  The United Kingdom likely would enforce its own conditions 
of isolation and suffering on infected individuals in the case of a pandemic, and every country lacking the capacity 
to handle the pandemic would become a country of isolation, squalor, and destitution. 
15 DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES chs. 7-8 (Clarendon Press 1999) [hereinafter 
FIDLER, INFECTIOUS DISEASES].  
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Industrialized nations, international law practitioners, and scholars have not been blind to 
the threat of disease.  For more than 150 years, nations have been forming multilateral 
agreements designed to halt the spread of infection.16  The impetus for the original agreements 
was to protect the flow of commercial goods and tourists across borders.17  However, as the 
world’s population has tripled to 6.5 billion over the last fifty years18 and national economies 
have become increasingly interdependent, priorities in the control of infectious disease have 
matured. 
This article will focus on the two major United Nations (“UN”) agreements that have 
attempted to regulate the activities of Member States as they relate to infectious disease.  The 
International Health Regulations (“IHR”)19 protects public health directly by providing a 
structure for global disease reporting and by enumerating the rights and duties of individual 
states in controlling the spread of disease.20  The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”)21 protects public health indirectly by dictating the 
circumstances under which international trade may be restricted to prevent the spread of 
disease.22   
Part I of this article analyzes the transition from the old International Health Regulations 
(“IHR”) to the newly revised IHR and the rights and duties of States created by this new 
framework.  Part II considers the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
                                                 
16 Id. at ch. 2 (examining the history of international control of infectious disease). 
17 Id. at 61. 
18 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, Total Midyear Population for the World: 1950-2050 (April 26, 
2005), available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldpop.html.  
19 Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA Res. 58.3, World Health Assembly, 58th Ass. (May 23, 
2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58_3-en.pdf. [hereinafter IHR] 
20 Id. at pmbl. 6(2). 
21 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the 
Uruguay Round vol. 27, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement].  
22 See id. 
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Measures (“SPS Agreement”) and analyzes specific illustrations of the SPS Agreement at work.  
Both Parts I and II provide real and hypothetical examples of health emergencies in order to 
create context for analyzing the regulations and to fill in some of the peripheral gaps.  Finally, 
Part III notes some of the strengths and weaknesses of the regulations by applying them to a 
simplified hypothetical H5N1 avian flu pandemic.  
I.  THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 
The revised International Health Regulations will become binding on Member States in 
2007, twenty-four months after the WHO Director-General adopted them.23  The original IHR, 
adopted in 1951 and initially titled the International Sanitary Regulations (“ISR”), was 
comparatively narrow in scope and intent.24  The WHO had no enforcement capabilities under 
the old regulatory scheme and, as a result, countries largely ignored many disease notification 
requirements.25  This disregard, in part, prevented any disease control custom from maturing into 
binding international law.26   
The World Health Assembly adopted the revised IHR in the era of modern infectious 
disease.27  In March 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) plagued several parts 
of the world.28  After nine months of outbreaks, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) 
reported 8422 SARS cases and 916 SARS deaths worldwide.29  SARS was a first in many 
respects; for example, SARS was the first severe infectious disease of the 21st century fueled by 
                                                 
23 IHR, supra note 19, at art 59.2. 
24 Lawrence O. Gostin, World Health Law: Toward a New Conception of Global Health Governance for the 21st 
Century, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L & ETHICS 413, 415 (2005) [hereinafter Gostin, World Health Law]. 
25 FIDLER, INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 15, at 65-67. 
26 Id. at 102. 
27 IHR, supra note 19; David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Convention to Global Health Security: The New 
International Health Regulations, CHINESE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Fidler, Security: The New IHR]. 
28 See Jason W. Sapsin et al., SARS, Public Health, and Global Governance, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 159-161 (2004).  
29 DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE 3 (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 
[hereinafter FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE, AND GLOBALIZATION]. 
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global air travel.30  As such, SARS was the first infectious disease not subject to traditional 
limitations of transmission.  Specifically, the disease could not have “burned itself out” by killing 
off its primary population because it was not “an infectious disease confined to a particular 
geographical location.”31  SARS also was the first pandemic during which the WHO was able to 
appraise the potential influence of the revised health regulations.  
In 2005, after ten years of work, the Member States of the World Health Assembly 
(“WHA”) adopted the revised IHR.32  The goal of this new convention was to ensure “the 
application of adequate measures for the protection of public health and strengthening of the 
global public-health response to the international spread of disease.”33  The revision of the IHR 
was “a closely watched and often controversial international legal reform effort” as the revisers 
sought the proper balance between protection of state sovereignty and independence on one hand 
and adequate global protection from the spread infectious disease on the other.34  The revised 
IHR is broader in scope than the original regulations and affects the responsibilities of state 
actors, the rights among states, and the authority of the WHO in dealing with the control and 
containment of infectious disease. 
A.  The Original International Health Regulations: The IHR 
 
From the first international sanitary conference, held in 1851, until the WHO formally 
adopted the ISR in 1951, there was little change in the objective of international infectious 
disease regulation.35  The goal of the ISR – subsequently renamed the IHR – was to “protect 
States against the international spread of infectious disease in a way that minimized interference 
                                                 
30 Id. at 6. 
31 Id. 
32 IHR, supra note 19; Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27. 
33 IHR, supra note 19, at pmbl 6(2).  
34 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 2. 
35 Id. at 3. 
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with international trade and travel.”36  This principle was concisely reflected in the three primary 
obligations under the old IHR: notification, transport hygiene, and vaccination certification.37  
These objectives were limited in three ways.  First, these were the only international regulations 
to cover infectious diseases.  Second, the only diseases covered were cholera, plague, and yellow 
fever.38  Third, these measures were “the maximum measures applicable to international 
traffic,”39 and therefore Member States could not impose more stringent requirements.  
Ultimately, the IHR were commerce-centered safety measures designed both to react to 
spreading infectious disease and to prevent states from harming international trade by 
overreacting to the threat of disease. 
The reactive system created by the IHR, though ambitious for its time, ultimately was 
ineffective.  Economic realities and the lack of an enforcement mechanism rendered the states’ 
obligations of notification, certification, and hygienic transport both economically unfeasible and 
practically unenforceable.  Under the old regulations, nations were bound only by honor to report 
any case of the three listed diseases to the WHO and, under the IHR, nations suffered no 
penalties for noncompliance.40  Such an idealistic requirement was doomed to fail.  Poorer 
nations with the highest rates of disease lacked the resources to report, while wealthy nations 
lacked incentive to report events that would harm trade and tourism.41  Certification requirements 
were equally problematic. When wealthy nations required health certificates, the subject diseases 
frequently were unlisted diseases, such as HIV, that nonetheless posed a great health risk.  
                                                 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Lawrence O. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World Health Organization’s 
International Health Regulations, 291 J.A.M.A. 2623, 2624 (June 2, 2004) [hereinafter Gostin, International 
Infectious Disease Law]. 
38 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 7. 
39 Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law, supra note 37, at 2624 (quoting the first IHR).  
40 Id. 
41 FIDLER, INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 15, at 66. 
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Again, whether for listed or for unlisted disease, poorer nations simply lacked the resources to 
comply with certification requirements.42  
Similarly, the hygienic transport hubs requirements, including clean water and food 
requirements, health inspections, and appropriate quarantine facilities, were neglected because 
poor nations lacked the resources to meet the requirements. 43  Wealthy nations also struggled 
with the transport hub requirements, but the difficulty was effectiveness rather than execution.  
Cholera, plague, Ebola, AIDS, and SARS often are not symptomatic infectious diseases during 
ingress and egress, but only become so after transit.44  Therefore, although some nations were 
facially compliant with the transport hubs requirements, those countries still were unable to stop 
diseases at the door.  
Moreover, the IHR’s reactive nature ultimately doomed the system because it provided 
no guidance for dealing with new and unknown infectious diseases.  Rather, “[a]ny new 
pathogen, or resurging old ones, not listed as ‘disease subject to the Regulations’ fell outside 
IHR’s surveillance system.”45  Emerging health threats such as Ebola and HIV/AIDS were 
neither reportable under the IHR nor subject to its tracking requirements.  In 1995, with 
HIV/AIDS and the proliferation of biological weapons drawing attention to world health issues, 
the WHO began revising the IHR.46  Further, the emergence of the SARS disease and the 
WHO’s ineffective handling of the outbreak accelerated the revision process.47  These events 
also demonstrated that the new IHR needed to be “a flexible framework that [could] respond to 
                                                 
42 Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law, supra note 37. 
43 Id. 
44 See generally National Center for Infectious Diseases, Infectious Disease Information, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/index.htm (last visited April 9, 2006). 
45 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 16. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 30. 
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unknown disease events rapidly.”48  In May 2005, the WHO adopted the new IHR, proclaiming 
the “effective death” of the traditional outbreak/response approach embodied in the old IHR.49  
B.  The Revised International Health Regulations: Expanded Goals and 
Broadened Scope 
 
Like the old system, the revised IHR’s goals include the avoidance of “unnecessary 
interference with world trade and travel.”50  Unlike the old system, the new IHR’s proactive 
disease-prevention measures center on public health and take qualified priority over commercial 
interests.  The broadened scope of the revised IHR reflects this shift in priorities. 
1. Broadened Definition of Disease 
The new IHR applies to broadly defined events.  Whereas the old regulations were 
limited to a small number of specific diseases, the revised IHR applies to all communicable and 
non-communicable public health emergencies of international concern and encompasses both 
natural and artificial threats.51  The IHR defines a public health emergency as “an extraordinary 
event [that] is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health 
threat risk to other States through the international spread of disease[;] and (ii) to potentially 
require a coordinated international response.”52  This definition requires some unpacking.  
An international public health emergency exists when there is a manifestation – or a clear 
danger of a manifestation – of a significant human medical illness that either poses a threat to the 
international population or requires a coordinated multinational response.  The language is broad 
enough to encompass both ongoing long-term diseases such as HIV/AIDS and future fast-
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 2. 
50 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 2. 
51 Id. at Annex I. 
52 Id. at art 1. 
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spreading communicable diseases that have not yet been identified.  Moreover, the definition 
also includes current but yet unrealized threats of such illnesses.  
Twenty-first century diseases such as SARS will be classified as public health 
emergencies under the revised IHR.  SARS first emerged in China in late 2002 and had been 
identified in Singapore, Hong Kong and Canada by March of 2003.53  The mobility of the 
disease and the evidence of cross-border transmission both suggest that SARS would have 
qualified as a threat to the international population.54  Furthermore, characteristics of the newly-
discovered disease, including the lack of diagnostic tests and a vaccine, the lack of effective 
treatment, and SARS’ 15% fatality rate 55 suggested both a threat to the international population 
and the need for a coordinated multinational response.  Thus, newly-discovered diseases like 
SARS now will fall under the IHR and will be subject to these international regulations as well 
as to country-specific treatment and prevention measures.56 
2.  Broadened Reporting Structure:  Information Centralization and 
Incorporation of Non-State Actors 
 
The second important structural component of the IHR is the WHO’s centralization of 
information and its incorporation of non-state actors.  Under the new IHR, the WHO has the 
“authority and responsibility . . . to collect and act upon sources of information.”57  That is, the 
WHO must collect disease event reports from Member States, must maintain qualified 
confidentiality on information, and must declare international public health emergencies.58  The 
                                                 
53 See Sapsin et al., supra note 28 (discussing SARS outbreaks and governmental responses in various affected 
nations). 
54 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 1. 
55 Sapsin et al., supra note 28, at 157. 
56 See id. 
57 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 52. 
58 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 5. 
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WTO also may use non-state sources of information concerning public health.59  When utilizing 
data from non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), the IHR “imposes duties on [the] WHO to 
engage in such collection efficiently and effectively . . . [and] verify such information.”60  
According to one commentator: 
[t]he New IHR . . . [makes] non-State actors formally part of the governance 
mechanism of the revised Regulations. Increasing the scope of participation in 
this way highlights how the process of achieving global health security differs 
from the State-centric approach of international health security found in the 
classical regime. WHO’s ability to gather and use non-governmental sources of 
information and the obligation on States Parties to respond to request for 
verification of such information received from WHO mean that States no longer 
dominate or control the process of epidemiological surveillance.61 
 
The value of this dynamic system is two-fold.  First, the IHR creates incentives for states 
to report health events while simultaneously allowing the WHO to collect data from 
NGO sources and declare public health emergencies in a state without that state’s 
consent.62  Second, the IHR requires transparency in the WHO’s process because the 
WHO must verify any NGO data that it relies on and also must demonstrate effective 
data collection techniques used by the particular NGO providing the data.63  Thus, the 
IHR diffuses the disincentives of reporting health events that plagued the old system. 
C. The Content of the Revised IHR 
The content of the revised IHR may best be understood by dividing the revision into two 
components: (1) the obligations of states and (2) the rights of states.  The new regulations take a 
formalistic international law approach, including the establishment of positive duties and the 
                                                 
59 Id at art. 7.  NGOs played a substantial role in the tracking the spread of SARS, but although NGOs may be 
reliable sources of information about infectious diseases, at least one commentator has argued that the WHO ought 
not to rely on the actions of parties that are not legally bound to the WHO.  See David Bishop, Note, Lessons from 
Sars: Why the WHO must Provide Greater Economic Incentives for Countries to Comply with International Health 
Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1173 (2005).  
60 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 52. 
61 Id. at 51. 
62 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 7. 
63 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 52. 
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handling of enforcement.  The revised IHR will become the central international framework for 
combating international infectious disease. 
1.  The Duties of States Under the Revised IHR 
 The IHR unquestionably raises issues of sovereignty because it imposes affirmative 
obligations on the independent nations that are members of the WHA.64  As Article 3.4 makes 
clear, “States . . . have the sovereign rights to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance 
of their health policies.  In doing so they should uphold the purpose of these Regulations.”65  
Clearly, the IHR runs into the same enforcement problems as other multilateral treaties.66  As 
noted however, these regulations provide incentives for nations, especially developed nations, to 
follow their obligations because Member States have no veto power over the WHO’s health 
emergency reports.67  
Annex I of the revised IHR spells out the “core capacity requirements for surveillance 
and response,”68 detailing states’ obligations under the IHR.  In particular, nations must “detect 
events involving disease,” must “assess reported events,” must “notify [the] WHO immediately,” 
and must “report all essential information.”69  Additionally, each state must create and maintain a 
“public health emergency contingency plan.”70  The responsibilities of states follow the 
overarching themes of the IHR: respond to the emergency and mitigate any resulting damage.  
Specifically, the IHR places duties on states by building a streamlined event reporting system 
and by importing binding aspects of international law into the health regulations. 
                                                 
64 See, generally, Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L  & COMP. L. REV. 213 (2002) (for a 
discussion of the interplay between treaty making, intergovernmental organizations, and state sovereignty). 
65 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 3.4. 
66 See infra Part III.B. 
67 Fidler, Security: The New IHR, supra note 27, at 52. 
68 IHR, supra note 19, at Annex I. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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 The IHR lays out a mandatory disease reporting system; states must follow the IHR’s 
decision instrument in deciding which events it must report to the WHO.71  This instrument 
describes three paths for reporting public health events.72  Each path lays out a course of 
treatment for a different class of diseases: (1) known diseases whose outbreaks are unexpected 
and serious, such as a new influenza strain or SARS; (2) known diseases with a demonstrated 
ability to become emergencies, including the plague or Ebola; and (3) unknown or potential 
threats.73  The instrument dictates that states must report any disease outbreak falling under class 
(1), and states must analyze the need to report to the WHO any disease outbreak falling under 
classes (2) and (3).74  The analysis weighs factors of seriousness, expectation, risk of spreading, 
and impact on trade.75   
For example, if a Romanian farmer contracts SARS, Romania must report the incident to 
WHO under class (1) because the outbreak would be of a disease known to be a serious threat.  
But if a rural healthcare worker in Zambia contracts cholera then the threat of international 
spread is lower and the event is less unusual.  The Zambia outbreak would not be “unexpected,” 
and the automatic reporting requirement under class (1) would not be triggered.  Under a class 
(2) analysis, Zambia may not be obliged to report the case.  In contrast, a cholera outbreak in 
South Korea might trigger a mandatory report by that country because cases are uncommon, a 
high population density exists, and international travel is more prevalent. 
 Another markedly different way that the revised IHR obliges states is by appropriating 
other aspects of international law and integrating them into the domestic public health 
                                                 
71 Id. at art. 6.1. 
72 Id. at Annex II. 
73 Id. 
74 IHR, supra note 19, at Annex I. 
75 Id. 
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requirements.76  Though states must satisfy the IHR health measures, the regulations do not 
preclude states from implementing domestic laws that “achieve the same or greater level of 
protection.”77  However, “such measures shall not be . . . more intrusive to persons than 
reasonably available alternatives.”78  This requirement invokes the Siracusa Principles, which 
outline the ways individual human rights may be curtailed for the protection of public health.79  
Unlike the decision instrument, which places a positive duty on states, the Siracusa Principles 
place a negative duty on states.  The Siracusa Principles require that states must enact only those 
health measures that are “necessary, proportionate, and fair” 80 and prohibit states from enacting 
health measures that fall outside the bounds of these criteria.81  In effect, the IHR couches public 
health in the broader context of international human rights law.  
Consider, for example, Canada’s first reported SARS patient in March 2003.82  The 
Canadian government amended its Quarantine Act and Regulations to “authorize detention of 
travelers with suspected SARS for up to twenty days.”83  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
now report that the incubation period for SARS is one to twelve days.84  Suppose China reports 
ten new cases of SARS among dockworkers.  If the Canadian government further amends its 
statute and quarantines all Chinese freight ships and crew suspected of carrying SARS for sixty 
days, Canada would violate the IHR.  First, Canada’s quarantine of all ships would be over-
                                                 
76 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, reprinted in 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 3, 7 (1985) [hereinafter The Siracusa Principles]; IHR, supra note 19, at 
art. 43.1. 
77 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1; The Siracusa Principles, supra note 76. 
78 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1. 
79 The Siracusa Principles, supra note 76; Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law, supra note 37, at 2626.  
80 Gostin, World Health Law, supra note 24, at 423. 
81 See, generally, Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy to 
Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 505 (1999) (discussing the Siracusa Principles 
and their application to public health regulations). 
82 Sapsin et al., supra note 28, at 161. 
83 Id. 
84 Martin I. Meltzer, Multiple Contact Dates and SARS Incubation Periods, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
207, 208 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no2/pdfs/03-0426.pdf.  
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inclusive because the quarantine would be “more restrictive of international traffic . . . than 
reasonably available alternatives.”85  Second, the Canadian measure would not be “based on 
scientific principles,”86 given that the average SARS incubation is four days.  To quarantine 
ships and travelers for sixty days violates the clear language of the IHR.87  Moreover, the broader 
human rights protections in the Siracusa Principles require that “government infringing on the 
enjoyment of human rights provide justification for such infringements.”88  Thus, the IHR 
“balance[s] sovereignty, science and public health” by requiring appropriate information and 
enjoining irrational or ill-suited reactions to public health emergencies.89  
2.  The Rights of the States Under the New IHR 
 The IHR lays out the rights that states have with respect to the WHO and clarifies 
domestic rights relating to public health emergencies.90  Although the notion of states’ rights 
implicates larger topics in international law, the IHR creates positive rights for states by 
outlining the WHO’s negative duties under the new regulations.  By enumerating states’ rights 
through the IHR, the WHO may be held expressly accountable for its actions.  Further, proper 
state action in difficult scenarios becomes clear when states understand not only their obligations 
but also the boundaries of their rights.  
One such right is the states’ right to confidentiality.  The WHO is obliged to keep all 
health data confidential except in the case of a “public health emergency of international 
concern” or where state control measures “are unlikely to succeed.”91  The value of this system is 
clear; the right to confidentiality encourages the flow of information and mitigates the 
                                                 
85 IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1. 
86 Id. 
87 The Siracusa Principles, supra note 76; IHR, supra note 19, at art. 43.1. 
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unnecessary loss of international commerce without extending so broadly as to threaten the 
public at large.  However, this right extends only to the relationship between the WHO and the 
Member States. 
The IHR also clarifies some activities that states may rightfully undertake irrespective of 
WHO, most notably the right to quarantine.  In April 2003, Singapore amended its Infectious 
Disease Act to “require persons with [possible SARS] to report to designated treatment centers, . 
. . enforce home quarantine with electronic tagging and forced detention; and allow the 
quarantine and destruction of SARS-contaminated property.”92  Singapore used fines, in-home 
cameras, and arrests to enforce the quarantine of over 740 people.93  All of these measures are 
acceptable under the new IHR.  Although the IHR requires medical examinations to be the “least 
obtrusive [measures] . . . that would achieve the public health objective,”94 the same standard 
does not expressly apply to vaccinations, prophylaxes, isolations, or quarantines.  Furthermore, 
“the revised Regulations do not contain requirements that State Parties accord those subject to 
compulsory measures due process protection, such as the right to challenge such measures in 
court.”95  In this manner, the IHR affirms a State’s right to restrict and protect its population as it 
sees fit.  
Rather than establishing rules for uniform quarantine policies among states, the IHR does 
not expressly attempt to limit or guide the use of quarantine. 96  Instead, a state may quarantine a 
person without that person’s consent when the state deems that “such a compulsory measure is 
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necessary to control an imminent public health threat.”97  There are three reasons for making this 
an unquestionable states’ right.  First, the WHO lacks the ability to enforce uniform domestic 
quarantines.  Adding superfluous or symbolic requirements to binding regulations weakens the 
overall system.  Second, nations would be unlikely to agree to give up sovereign rights of self-
governance and domestic population control in making quarantine decisions.  Even if quarantine 
rules were merely an unenforceable gesture, such an act might gestate into binding international 
custom despite states’ objections.  Third, the imposition of hard and fast limits on the ability of 
states to isolate sections of its population is not in the interest of the WHO or its Member States, 
even when extreme circumstances would implicate human rights.  These regulations are not 
meant to symbolically handcuff states in the face of international public health threats, especially 
when those threats are unpredictable.  The threat to the population’s welfare outweighs the lack 
of “compulsory due process protections, such as the right to challenge [quarantine] in court.”98 
The SARS outbreak illustrates why the WHO is not in a position to uniformly constrain 
quarantine policy.  In Singapore, 740 people were under full quarantine measures within twenty-
four days of the first SARS cases.99  Through the emergency measures, “the average time from 
onset of SARS symptoms to isolation of probable cases declined . . . from 6.8 days to 1.3 
days.”100  In total, Singapore reported 238 cases with a population density of 6,400 persons per 
square kilometer.101  Similarly, in Hong Kong more than 1,000 people were quarantined within 
twenty-three days after the first case of SARS in that country.102  Hong Kong has a similar 
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population density of 6,300 persons per square kilometer, but reported 1,755 cases in total.103  
This data says nothing about how many people must be quarantined or how quickly a state must 
quarantine them to control the spread of infectious disease, but it does indicate that WHO is not 
is a position to uniformly constrain quarantine policy.  Ultimately, by affirming national control 
of quarantine, the IHR avoids emersion in a politically controversial subject and promotes 
responses that are more adaptable to circumstances in individual states. 
II.  THE AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES AND JUSTIFIED TRADE RESTRICTION 
 
 The IHR is not the only system of international regulations that functions to protect 
against infectious disease.  In 1998, the WHO presented information to the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) on the IHR.104  The goal of this meeting was to coordinate the new public 
health measures of the IHR with the existing and binding public health framework of the 
WTO.105  One of the founding pillars of the WTO is the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.106  This agreement seeks to reduce international trade 
barriers by ensuring that “countries apply measures to protect human, animal and plant health 
based on assessment of risk.”107  Given that practically all members of the WHO also are 
members of the WTO and that the WTO has binding enforcement mechanisms, those in the 
WHO charged with revising the IHR understood that “harmonizing the IHR and SPS Agreement 
would reflect [a] common purpose and avoid any potential conflict in the obligations of Member 
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States.”108  Consequently, the revised IHR was tailored to comport with the SPS Agreement.  As 
such, an understanding of the IHR and the complete infectious disease international law régime 
requires careful examination of the WTO’s role in protecting public health. 
A.   The History and Scope of the SPS Agreement 
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) became “the first 
multilateral trade agreement that attempted to provide rules for global trade.”109  The 
infrastructure of this agreement addressed state behaviors that could affect public health.110  The 
framers of GATT attempted to “balance the sovereign right to keep out products that may 
threaten a nation’s health with disciplines to prevent this right from being misused for 
discriminatory or protectionist purposes.”111  
The treatment of British exports following the discovery of mad cow disease serves as an 
example of a public health emergency under GATT.  In 1996, Britain reported several cases of 
mad cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (“BSE”)), which scientists linked to a 
fatal human brain disease called Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.112  In reaction, the European Union 
(“EU”) banned all exports of British beef.113  The disease claimed ten human lives by 1997, and 
the British beef industry had lost over $2.37 billion dollars by 1999.114  Though not in force at 
the time, this incident illustrates a clear public health emergency under Article XX(b) of GATT: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevails, or a distinguished restriction on 
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international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.115 
 
In the case of BSE, the disease posed a significant threat of spreading to domestic cattle and 
infecting humans.  Despite huge financial losses that resulted from the ban, Britain would have 
had no recourse under GATT because the ban (1) was not arbitrary, (2) was not disguised or 
unjustifiably discriminatory, and (3) was meant to protect life and health.116 
 However, Article XX(b)’s coverage was not always clear.  Parties made radical changes 
to GATT in the Uruguay Round.117  In 1993, the WTO substantially revised the goals and 
principles of GATT and adopted the SPS Agreement.118  The SPS Agreement moves beyond 
Article XX(b) in two substantial ways.  First, a protective sanitary trade measure meets the SPS 
Agreement if and only if it “is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence.”119  For example, in 1991, Peru reported a cholera outbreak with 
more than 300,000 infected persons.120  Peru lost over $12.9 billion in trade because of 
worldwide bans of Peruvian imports that nations imposed at the time of the cholera outbreak.121  
Peru complained “that the GATT rules were being ignored and other states were imposing trade-
damaging health protection measures against Peru that lacked scientific support or clear public 
health rationales.”122  The SPS Agreement’s scientific justification clause solves this problem 
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because “[n]o longer can health policy that affects trade be created out of fear, superstition, or 
any other illegitimate basis.” 123  Instead, trade restrictions imposed in response to infectious 
disease outbreaks must be “made fairly and for legitimate reasons.”124 
 The SPS Agreement also moves beyond GATT’s initial scope because all WTO Member 
States must adopt its terms.125  As one of the founding WTO multilateral agreements, “any State 
wanting to become a Member State of WTO has to accept the SPS Agreement.”126  Therefore the 
WTO has the authority to settle any dispute between Member States over whether trade bans 
“involving scientific or technical issues” actually are protectionist measures designed to keep 
foreign products out of a state’s economy.127  Unlike the prior GATT procedure, where little 
recourse could be taken against a party that disagreed with the decision of a dispute settlement 
panel, the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure allows states to impose trade sanctions for 
violations.128  Whereas prior to the SPS Agreement Peru had no practical means to attack “trade-
damaging health measures that lack[ed] scientific rationale,”129 the binding dispute settlement 
provisions attached to the SPS Agreement would assure Peru a chance to argue its position to the 
WTO.  Thus, the SPS Agreement is “the first international agreement attempting to balance trade 
and public health that contains a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.”130 
B.  The SPS Agreement, the Precautionary Principle, and Scientific Justification 
 
 Scientific justification under the SPS Agreement is a highly contentious issue when 
applied to the spread of infectious disease.  Not surprisingly, when an infectious disease 
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threatens to disrupt highly profitable trade, the strength and scope of the SPS Agreement come 
under fire.   
The interplay between the scientific justification requirement and the Precautionary 
Principle was at issue as nations struggled with the threat of made cow disease (BSE).  The 
Precautionary Principle embodies the rule that “countries may take precautionary measures to 
protect their populace from disease.”131  In 1999, the EU responded to the BSE scare by 
uniformly banning the use of animal remains with a high risk of containing BSE.132  The EU ban 
included a prohibition on imports of animal feed and secondary products containing animal parts, 
including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and lubricants that contain tallow (boiled animal fat).133  
Tallow derivatives are the key ingredients in more than $4.5 billion of U.S. pharmaceutical 
exports.134  After negotiations with the United States, the EU dropped its ban on products 
containing tallow while still maintaining that soaps and cosmetics containing beef products could 
transmit BSE.135  In 2001, the WTO’s SPS Committee met to discuss the application of the SPS 
Agreement to the BSE epidemic.136  Peru, Chile, and the United States complained that the EU’s 
restrictions on certain type of feed for cattle were not scientifically justified.137 
 One major point of contention was whether the EU’s trade barriers and risk classification 
system were “a legitimate exercise of the Precautionary Principle.”138  The EU took the position 
that the SPS Agreement allowed it “to ban a product as long as there is a legitimate belief that 
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the product poses a threat to health and the environment even if no concrete scientific evidence 
supports such a belief.”139  However, the European Commission’s (“EC”) own communication 
states that the Precautionary Principle applies “where preliminary objective scientific evaluation 
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that [there are] potentially dangerous 
effects.”140  The implication of the EU’s position was that under the Precautionary Principle “a 
state could prevent an import indefinitely until evidence convinces it otherwise.”141  Article 5.7 
of the SPS Agreement clearly limits such an argument, 142 stating that: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information . . . .  In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and 
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time.143  
 
A ban on products that actually had been shown to transmit BSE to humans or a ban on feeding 
practices shown to transmit BSE between cattle would satisfy SPS requirements, even if the risk 
of transmission is low.  However, no objective evidence demonstrating a risk of disease 
transmission existed in this case. 
 The WTO rejected the EU’s invocation of the Precautionary Principle and required 
removal of the EU’s ban.144  The WTO also rejected similar arguments by the EC with respect to 
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its ban on beef containing certain hormones in the late 1990s.145  In that case, the WTO 
Appellate Panel noted that “the Precautionary Principle has been incorporated and given a 
specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.”146  The Panel acknowledged its 
responsibility to determine “whether ‘sufficient scientific evidence’ exists to warrant the 
maintenance . . . of a particular SPS measure” and held that “the Precautionary Principle does not 
. . . relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e. customary international law) 
principles of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement.”147  Although 
the panel indicated that Member States deserve some deference when acting to protect against 
“irreversible . . . damage to human health[,]” it affirmatively stopped short of creating an SPS 
loophole that would allow a state to enact such a protectionist measure without scientific 
evidence.148  
 Through the SPS participation requirement and the WTO’s enforcement mechanisms, 
nations may demand objective and verifiable evidence to support trade barriers.  This structure 
cleverly encourages nations to take a proactive role in preventing infectious disease.  Where 
under GATT a state could use the unverifiable prospective threat of disease to impose import 
bans, the SPS Agreement compels preventive and reactive research both to protect domestic 
populations from harm and to protect exports from deceptive trade practices.  
III.  THE ROLE OF THE IHR AND THE SPS AGREEMENT IN A H5N1 AVIAN FLU PANDEMIC 
One law and economics commentator noted that “even a ‘medium-level’ flu pandemic 
could cause up to 200,000 U.S. deaths and a purely economic impact (that is, ignoring the non-
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pecuniary cost of death and illness) of more than $150 billion.”149  According to other accounts, 
a “relatively minor” H5N1 pandemic in Asia would likely cause a “loss of 6.5 per cent of Asian 
GDP, probably contributing to a global recession and reducing global trade of goods and services 
by 14 per cent, or [$2,500 billion dollars].”150  The magnitude of this threat begs the question: 
What role would the IHR and the SPS Agreement play in the event of an avian flu outbreak? 
A. Hypothetical H5N1 Outbreak and the Application of International 
Regulations 
 
An outbreak of avian flu could follow a pattern similar to that of the SARS outbreak, 
except on a larger scale.  Suppose that in November 2008, an NGO in China reports that during 
the past week 1% of the population of Hong Kong (130,000 people) have begun showing flu-like 
symptoms.  The Chinese government denies these reports, but begins substantially limiting travel 
into and out of the country and simultaneously freezes out the foreign media.  Suppose further 
that Singapore reports outbreaks of a mutated form of the H5N1 flu to the WHO, including over 
8,000 confirmed H5N1 cases with 1,050 deaths.  In response, Singapore has ordered the in-home 
quarantine of over 20,000 citizens and has halted all egress travel.  The Netherlands reports to 
the WHO the localized transmission of an unknown pathogen to several Rotterdam dockworkers, 
their families, and the staff at a local hospital (twenty people, including four Belgium nationals, 
and two deaths).  In response to these reports, Canada bans all imports from China, Singapore, 
and the Netherlands and places a trade ban on all Belgian chocolate. 
Under the revised IHR, the situations in Singapore and in China constitute international 
public health emergencies.  Both situations indicate a public health threat of spreading a serious 
disease that requires a coordinated international response.  In October 2005, both Romania and 
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Turkey reported the first cases of the H5N1 avian influenza in Europe.151  With only 117 cases of 
human transmission worldwide, H5N1 was not yet a medical condition harming a large human 
population.152  However, the 1918 Spanish-flu epidemic claimed more than fifty million lives, 
and just like H5N1 avian influenza, it “originated in birds before mutating and spreading to 
humans.”153  Given the mobility of this disease, evidence of cross-border transmission, and the 
historical significance of previous incarnations of similar diseases, the current virus “could 
present significant harm to humans.”154  The situations in Singapore and in China also would fall 
under the new IHR. 
The IHR decision instrument compels Singapore to report the H5N1 human infection and 
unexpected outbreak of this new form influenza.155  The Siracusa Principles support Singapore’s 
containment policy so long as it does not violate minimum human rights norms – such as by 
declining to provide access to food and water for those quarantined.156  Because China refuses to 
provide information about a possible outbreak, the WHO may rely on reports from the NGO.157  
If verified, the magnitude and the expectation of the spread of the disease would compel the 
WHO to declare the Chinese outbreak a health emergency of international concern.158  
The situation in the Netherlands is less clear.  It may be proper for the Netherlands to 
report the outbreak because the outbreak is unexpected, carries a high potential for serious 
impact, and may affect international trade.  However, given the small number of reported 
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infections and the unknown nature of the pathogen, there remains a subjective determination to 
be made by the Dutch as to whether a report to the WHO is obligatory.159   
 Under the SPS Agreement, Canada’s ban on all goods from China, Singapore, and the 
Netherlands is defensible.160  A sovereign nation may limit traffic and goods from Singapore, 
who openly reported contamination.  Similarly, the reported magnitude of the outbreak in China 
and the Chinese government’s refusal to cooperate with world health officials gives Canada just 
cause to close its borders to Chinese imports.161  Likewise, Canada’s reaction to the Dutch is 
defensible because there is an arguable link between Dutch dockworkers coming into contact 
with people or goods from Asia.162   
However, the SPS Agreement would only allow this application of the Precautionary 
Principle to run so long as the data supported Canada’s position.163  If the Netherlands reports 
that the disease outbreak is contained or is unrelated to the H5N1 outbreak in Asia, Canada either 
would need to submit scientific evidence to the contrary or would need to drop its ban.  
Similarly, if several weeks go by with no new cases in Holland, or if health workers offered 
medically sound treatment and containment, Canada could not justify its position.164  Finally, 
Canada’s ban on Belgian chocolate would violate the SPS Agreement.165  The ban is 
discriminatory in that it impacts only one particular item of trade goods and is scientifically 
unjustified because no cases of H5N1 have been reported in Belgium.  
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B. Strengths and Weakness of International Regulations in an H5N1 Outbreak 
   As opposed to the original IHR, the revised IHR is responsive and productive during this 
potential H5N1 pandemic.  Influenza was not a listed disease under the old IHR, and there was 
no official influenza vaccination certification requirement.  Despite the widespread outbreak of 
an identified infectious disease, under the original IHR Singapore would have had no obligation 
to report to the WHO or any other county the potential danger of a spreading pandemic.  Though 
the flu-like symptoms in China raise the specter of a cholera outbreak, China too would have had 
no duty to report an unidentified widespread illness.  Furthermore, with greater than $583 billion 
in exports in 2004, 166 China would have had a great deal of incentive to keep its export market 
secure by not reporting a domestic epidemic.  
Similarly, the Netherlands would have had no reason to report any health concerns under 
the original IHR.  The illness may have spread through unsatisfactory sanitary conditions in the 
Rotterdam seaport, but it is unlikely that a cost-benefit analysis would have compelled the 
Netherlands to take reactive reporting and sanitary measures in light of the limited disease 
transmission.  Lastly, the old IHR would not have sustained Canada’s imposition of health 
measures on incoming vessels because the old regulations did not permit nations to take any 
measures to protect public health that were more restrictive than the IHR itself proscribed. 
 The new regulations eliminate many of these problems and allow the WHO to play a 
larger role in the public health emergencies of all three countries.  First, the revised IHR creates a 
system where the WHO can collect data and coordinate a response to the emergencies.  By using 
NGO public health data, the IHR compels China to adjust its policies in response to the WHO’s 
unsanctioned infectious disease report.  Resolving public health emergencies and suppressing 
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cross border disease transmission is a positive sum effort, but issues of sovereignty, lack of 
resources, and lack of motivation normally would limit the international response of individual 
nations.  Through the revised IHR, the WHO also can use NGO and national health data to 
identify the similarities between the China, Singapore, and Netherlands H5N1 outbreaks as well 
as to track the geographic transmission pathways, to analyze the H5N1 threat to other nations, 
and to coordinate an international response to mitigate the harm and prevent further spreading.  
These containment measures, which extend beyond the borders of any particular nation, would 
be essential to minimizing the scope and effect of an international H5N1 epidemic.  
Second, although the IHR affirms the sovereign right of Singapore to determine its own 
internal quarantine policy, international involvement promotes scrutiny of human rights.  Though 
merely an international peer pressure system of human rights, the IHR’s approach is 
comparatively progressive to the old regulations and creates a framework upon which individual 
states can build.  Moreover, combined with the WHO’s response coordination, the IHR raises the 
likelihood of international participation in funding and maintaining humane quarantine 
conditions. 
 The weaknesses of the IHR in an H5N1 outbreak are similar to the limitations present in 
other types of international regulation.  First, enforcement is highly problematic in best-case 
scenarios and impossible under less favorable circumstances.  The WHO has no recourse against 
China for China’s refusal to cooperate with health officials.  Moreover, in some cases, the 
WHO’s use of NGO data concerning H5N1 outbreaks could backfire.  In the face of such a 
severe health threat, nations such as China or Russia might further restrain the freedom of NGOs 
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and lessen transparency when disclosure of NGO information threatens national exports and 
profits.167   
Second, developing nations with limited public health resources face the same problems 
under the new IHR as they faced under the old regulations.  Although the revised IHR may be 
more effective in the face of an H5N1 epidemic, the IHR does not, of course, provide nations 
with the funding to implement the proscribed regulations or even to create the infrastructure 
necessary for implementation.  Given that political interest in countries with limited trade value 
may be limited, poorer countries are unlikely to have the resources to implement many of the 
IHR’s new requirements.  As such, the new IHR could devolve into a de facto reactive system 
for some countries.  
 The positive and negative value of the SPS Agreement in an H5N1 outbreak is much less 
clear.  As a preventative measure, however, the SPS Agreement’s benefit is substantial.  The 
scientific justification requirement functions as both a sword and a shield for nations whose 
economies depend largely upon international trade.  China – along with the rest of Asia – has a 
strong motivation to conduct scientific research on the H5N1 avian flu.  Nations that understand 
the nature of the disease and the mechanics of its transmission can use that information to argue 
against unjustifiable trade bans.  Thus the SPS Agreement provides nations with a weapon to 
combat restrictions on that nation’s exports.  This same research works as a shield to justify and 
protect the researching nation’s legitimate trade restrictions, providing support for that nation’s 
import bans.  Of course, the same H5N1 research inspired for the protection of trade also would 
be critical to the development of both preventive and reactive scientific solutions to the bird flu 
epidemic.   
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With the knowledge that Canada could uniformly ban all Chinese exports based on a 
legitimate fear of the H5N1 virus, China would be strongly motivated to implement prophylactic 
measures in protection of both its bird and its human populations.  By implementing an effective 
domestic response mechanism and by providing scientific evidence of a working inoculation, 
China would have the tools to combat what could become an unreasonable and harmful 
Canadian trade barrier.  Thus the SPS Agreement encourages both proactive and reactive 
infectious disease response and it creates a system of scientific information leverage in trade 
disputes.  
 The SPS Agreement’s weaknesses during an H5N1 outbreak also are significant.  First, 
the scientific leverage may be largely symbolic.  As with concerns about genetically-modified 
foods in Europe or fear of mad cow disease in Japan, if the internal political and social pressure 
is sufficient then Canada will ban all Chinese goods despite credible evidence that such a 
reaction would be scientifically unjustifiable.  Conversely, as import markets grow dependent on 
Chinese goods, domestic forces within Canada could prevent a uniform trade ban despite 
compelling scientific evidence that indicated greater restrictions are warranted.  As a reactionary 
tool to prevent the spread of the H5N1 flu, the SPS Agreement therefore may have limited 
influence. 
The second weakness of the SPS Agreement is the long-term nature of dispute resolution 
and enforcement though the WTO.  In the hypothetical, Singapore has 1,050 H5N1 deaths in one 
week.  The threat of a binding dispute resolution one to two years after the first resulting trade 
barriers would have no impact on the actual reactions of other nations to the quickly-spreading 
and relatively short-term threat of H5N1 avian flu.  Rather, countries would ban imports from 
Singapore immediately and worry about international law repercussions later.   
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Such a dispute resolution process could provide retroactive relief for wrongly-affected 
nations once the pandemic is over. However, like all permissive WTO trade sanctions, a positive 
resolution would largely be constrained by the practicalities of any changing prices in the 
domestic market. That is, the seemingly victorious nation would be forced to balance the value 
accrued through permissive tariffs that diminish the demand for a particular import against the 
benefits harvested by the domestic population who are able to buy at a higher price and the loss 
felt by the domestic population shutout of the new market.  
Finally, as with other aspects of the WTO, some might claim that the SPS Agreement 
disregards the needs of developing nations.  With limited or nonexistent research capabilities, 
developing nations would have difficulty advancing any scientifically-supported arguments 
against trade or travel bans once an industrialized nation claims that a ban is scientifically 
reasonable.  Furthermore, industrialized nations might invoke the Precautionary Principle to 
justify a trade ban.  Developing nations without research capabilities would be unable to provide 
any scientific evidence to the contrary.  Thus, the SPS Agreement leaves developing nations in a 
position of weakness similar to that experienced under the old GATT. 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, both the IHR and SPS Agreement reflect a maturing understanding of the 
needs of the international community in combating the spread of disease and both agreements 
would function more effectively than their respective predecessors in the context of a H5N1 bird 
flu pandemic.  The revised IHR is a foundational agreement allowing the international 
community to designate the WHO as the central data collection body to help prevent outbreak 
and to coordinate a response that mitigates the impact on infected populations and international 
neighbors.  Unlike the previous international health regulations, the revised IHR would classify 
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the H5N1 flu as a public health emergency and would dictate the rights and duties of countries 
facing the emergency within their borders.  The SPS Agreement cultivates a scientific 
justification standard for health-based trade barriers and provides a neutral forum for disputes 
and, in the face of a developing H5N1 threat, these features of the Agreement should inspire 
government funding of research to understand, prevent, and combat the disease.  Much like 
environmental international law, these regulations suffer from weaknesses in enforcement 
mechanisms that could limit their effectiveness, but from a broad perceptive they clearly are 
progressive.  The two sets of regulations acknowledge and promote flexible responses by 
sovereign nations without overreaching.  They create incentive for information sharing and 
facilitate the role of an international body in leading the positive sum effort to prevent and 
control public health emergencies. Taken together, the IHR and the SPS Agreement create a 
more coherent and useful framework for coordinated international response to the serious and 
contemporary threat of an H5N1 epidemic. 
 
 
